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Uber’s ‘Partner-Bosses’
by Alex Rosenblat
Uber promo material
 
Uber has long claimed it’s a technology company, not a transportation company, and an
intermediary that connects supply (drivers) with demand (passengers). The language Uber uses
communicates a strong message of distance between itself and its relationship to drivers: Uber
classifies drivers as independent contractors, labels them “driver-partners”, and promotes them as
entrepreneurs, although the company faces legal challenges over issues of worker
misclassification. Uber relies on the politics of platforms to elude responsibility as a traditional
employer, as well as regulatory regimes designed to govern traditional taxi businesses. The
terminology Uber uses fosters a certain promise about the freedom of automated systems for
organizing work that credits workers with a lot of autonomy and independence.
In a 9-month empirical research study I did with Luke Stark (NYU), we discovered that Uber exerts
significant — albeit indirect — control over how and when drivers work through a system of semi-
automated and algorithmic management. Some of these findings are discussed in this blogpost.
Example of Uber advertising
Plouffe’s Augmented Workers
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David Plouffe, President Obama’s former 2008 campaign manager, was recruited to Uber as a
Senior Vice President of Policy and Strategy in September 2014. At a Tim O’Reilly Future of Work
(for business) conference in Dec. 2015, Plouffe took the stage, and thanked an Uber driver for
“working on the platform” (not for Uber) shortly after announcing that drivers are, in
fact, augmented workers (like the rest of us…). This language emphasizes that “humans” are not
at the centerpiece of Uber’s innovation: it’s the technology that matters. This public display of
technological dominance is re-iterated in Uber’s contracts with its drivers.
Uber’s legal contract with U.S.-based drivers states that Uber Technologies Inc. “provides lead
generation to independent providers of rideshare or peer-to-peer (collectively, “P2P”) passenger
transportation services.” In its contract with UK-based drivers (updated Oct. 20, 2015), drivers are
described as customers (i.e. consumers of the app, similar to passengers).
Both frames imply that drivers are not in a traditional employment relationship with Uber, and that
the platform is a neutral, software intermediary that merely connects drivers and passengers. Any
negative consequences are thus construed as a feature of connectivity, rather than as a function
of power relations. As our research illustrates, employment structures and hierarchies do emerge
through Uber’s software platform through automated management.
Labor Reclassification
Uber’s rhetoric and logic creates the context for policy developments around a new labor
classification that accommodates intermediary employer-platforms in the on-demand economy,
like Uber and Lyft.
Uber’s scaleable model can “enhance the efficiency of the operation of the labor market”
according to Seth D. Harris (Cornell), a former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Labor & Princeton labor
economist Alan Krueger (whom Uber funded for an Uber study of the labor market).
Krueger is on the academic speaker circuit to promote a new worker classification he developed
with Harris out of the Brookings Institution, labelled “Independent Worker,” as opposed to
“Independent Contractor.” Their report, “Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First Century Work”
supports the idea that platforms, like Uber’s, are mere intermediaries and highlights that these
intermediaries function as such because they control very few functions. They write, for instance,
“The intermediaries’ apps allow independent workers to select which customers they would like to
serve. The intermediary does not assign the customer to the independent worker; rather, the
independent worker chooses or declines to serve the customer (sometimes within broadly defined
limits)” (p. 9).
However, as we found out in our research project, that’s not what work looks like for Uber drivers.
Autonomy or Control?
Uber is a passenger-facing company: it offers a relatively
seamless way to achieve a mostly homogenous experience for
getting from A to B in hundreds of cities and over 60 countries.
Yet, as I detail below, this successful standardization is in
tension with entrepreneurship. Drivers must submit to a system
that molds their interactions, controls their behavior, sets and
changes pay rates unilaterally without consulting their
“partners,” and is generally structured to minimize the power of
driver voices.
As Luke Stark and I observe in our research report (p. 4),
Uber’s system enforces blind acceptance of passengers by
drivers, who are not shown the passenger’s destination or how
much they could earn on the fare. Drivers risk “deactivation” (an
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Message received by driver
from Uber
Uber word meaning to be suspended or removed permanently
from the system) for canceling unprofitable fares, such as short,
minimum fare rides.
The Uber system requires drivers to maintain a low cancellation
rate, such as 5% in San Francisco (as of July 2015), and a high
acceptance rate, such as 80% or 90%. Drivers absorb the risk,
produced through information asymmetry, of unknown and
unprofitable fares, even though Uber promotes the idea that
they are entrepreneurs who are knowingly investing in such
risk.
Drivers have to maintain a high star rating to remain active on
the Uber platform, such as 4.6/5. They are highly encouraged to
subscribe to a long list of etiquette of how they should behave
in order to elicit high ratings from passengers, who are
prompted to rate them at the end of each trip. This code of
conduct is couched in the language of a recommendation, such
as: “Riders give the best ratings to drivers who…” followed by
items like “Riders prefer for drivers not to promote other
businesses during the trip.” The power of the rating system is its
ability to mediate Uber’s power indirectly: for example, Uber
provides training videos (relevant part 6:19-6:51) to drivers
suggesting that 5-star drivers provide phone charging cords or bottled water to passengers.
A sample performance evaluation a driver received about
their rating, and a deactivation warning another driver
received
If drivers opt not to follow Uber’s suggested etiquette, they risk lower ratings and deactivation. In
this way, the rating system automates the management process of keeping workers in line with
certain performance targets and behaviors. The automation of quality control over a large,
disaggregated workforce is not to be confused with independence for workers.
The Algorithmic Manager
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Notice of 10 minute time-out
Uber uses surge pricing to organize drivers to work at a particular place at a particular time,
without guaranteeing the validity of the surge incentive if they do follow it. Surge is produced
through an algorithmic assessment of supply and demand and is subject to constant dynamism.
Uber sends real-time and predictive alerts to drivers about “high demand” and drivers interpret that
messaging to mean “surge will happen.”
Notices drivers receive urging them to move to areas of high demand or
to keep driving
Many drivers expressed frustration and enthusiasm alike for surge pricing, because its very
dynamism is characteristically fickle and opaque. Drivers noted that they would sometimes
converge en masse at a surging area, and find that supply was no longer too low — the surge
would disappear. Some drivers reported experimenting with trying to game these algorithms, and
many developed responses to surge pricing based on their experience with its duration, reliability,
and potential reward in their respective locations.
Besides, the rate that drivers are paid is based on the passenger’s location, not their own. Even
when they travel to an active surge zone, they risk receiving passengers at lower or higher surge
than is initially advertised, or getting fares from outside the surge zone.
Drivers are penalized if they try to assert a preference for
surging fares over non-surging fares. For example, drivers will
be locked out of the system for varying periods of time, like 10
minutes, 30 minutes, etc. for declining too many rides. They
also get warnings of deactivation for “manipulating” surge.
Uber drivers are “free” to login or log-out to work at will, but
their ability to make choices that benefit their own interests,
such as accepting higher-fare passengers, is severely limited.
That power dynamic reflects the divide between drivers and
Uber more broadly.
Where Do We Go From Here?
The “independent worker” category provokes policy debates
about the right way to address worker protections and rights in
an on-demand economy. But, as Sara Horowitz of the
Freelancer’s Union observes, the organization of work through
technology evolves quickly and iteratively, and policy may not
adequately foresee or forestall the consequences or
implications of large-scale, on-demand labor models.
Independent contractors, independent workers, or platform-
entrepreneurs would be better served by the additional
creation of representative-intermediaries who can challenge
and negotiate the hierarchies or employment structures that emerge through software platforms.
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Part of this blog is excerpted from our research draft.
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